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12.1  Introduction 
Five years after the eruption of the debt crisis most countries of the 
developing world are still struggling to get back on their feet. Although 
the collapse of  the world financial system predicted by  some overly 
pessimistic observers has not materalized, the debt crisis is far from 
over.  In  fact, when  traditional  creditworthiness  indicators,  such as 
debt-exports or debt-service ratios are analyzed, the highly indebted 
countries are now (late 1987) in an even weaker position than in 1982 
(see Edwards  1987a). It has  now become apparent that a long-term 
resolution of the debt problems will be a painful and protracted process, 
that will still require major additional adjustment efforts by the indebted 
countries, as well as extensive negotiations between debtor govern- 
ments, creditor governments, the multilateral institutions, and the banks. 
The adjustment approaches followed until now by most of the highly 
indebted countries can best  be described as emergency  stabilization 
programs geared towards generating very large trade balance surpluses 
in very short periods of time. Given the sudden halt in external financing 
after 1982, these countries had little choice but to use every possible 
tool at their disposal to achieve the needed turnabout in their current 
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accounts. As a consequence the adjustment process has been quite 
costly, generating  drastic declines  in  real  income and important in- 
creases in  unemployment.  In  fact, in  a  number of  Latin American 
countries in 1986 real per capita GDP was below its 1970 level (Edwards 
1987a)! A long-run solution to the debt crisis problem would entail: (I) 
the regaining of creditworthiness by these countries, and thus the re- 
sumption of voluntary lending by the international financial community; 
and (2) the resumption of  sustained growth. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze a number of issues related 
to structural adjustment in the highly indebted developing countries. 
The chapter begins with a review of the main features of the adjustment 
process followed during 1982-87;  it is noted that in almost every case 
this has been a period of recessionary adjustment based on investment 
and import cuts. Then, the potential role of trade liberalization reforms 
in the resumption of sustained growth in these countries is examined. 
The analysis deals with (1) the relation  between outward orientation, 
export promotion, and  growth; (2) appropriate sequencing  of  trade 
liberalization and stabilization programs; (3) tariff  reform and unem- 
ployment; (4)  credibility and  structural reforms; and  (5) the role of 
devaluations in structural reform programs. 
12.2  The Nature of  the Adjustment, 1982-87 
12.2.1  Origins of the Crisis 
During the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s most of the 
developing nations embarked on a foreign borrowing binge. Between 
1975 and 1982 the developing world's long-term foreign debt more than 
tripled,  growing from $162.5 billion  to $551.2 billion.  Naturally, this 
huge increase in indebtedness was made possible by the liberal way in 
which, after the first oil shock in 1973, the international financial com- 
munity and in particular the banks, provided funds to these countries. 
There is no doubt that the pace at which the developing countries were 
accumulating debt in the late 1970s and early 1980s-at  a rate exceeding 
20 percent per year-was  not sustainable in the medium to longer run; 
some type of adjustment was bound to  take place. The world, however, 
was shocked by the severity of the crisis; instead of there being an 
orderly and slow reduction of the flow of borrowing, a major crisis that 
brought capital flows to a virtual halt took place.' 
The behavior of the world economy during the early  1980s, and in 
particular the increase of interest rates, the decline in commodity prices, 
and the sluggish growth of the industrial countries, played an important 
role in  determining the magnitude and timing  of the crisis.  Also, in 
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tries contributed greatly to the crisis. In particular, lax fiscal policies 
and inadequate exchange rate policies that resulted in acute overval- 
uations  greatly  weakened  the external sector in  many  of the highly 
indebted countries. Perhaps one of the most devasting effects of the 
generalized tendency towards real exchange rate overvaluation is that 
it fueled massive capital flight out of the developing world. In country 
after country, as  it became increasingly apparent that the overvaluation 
was  unsustainable  in  the longer  run, the public  began  to speculate 
heavily  against the central  bank  by  acquiring foreign exchange and 
moving it abroad. In fact, in a recent empirical study Cuddington (1986) 
has found that there is a significant relation between overvaluation and 
capital flight. 
12.2.2  The Adjustment 
In August of  1982, immediately following Mexico’s announcement 
that it was facing serious  financial difficulties, the international financial 
community greatly reduced the amount of funds intermediated to the 
developing world.  For the developing countries as a whole external 
financing was reduced by almost 40 percent between 1981 and 1983. 
Moreover, the major debtors were forced to fully close a current ac- 
count deficit that by 1982 had exceeded $50 billion in less than 3 years. 
By 1985 the aggregate current account had reached virtual equilibrium 
(-$0.1  billion)  (see table  12.1). These very  rapid  adjustments were 
achieved entirely by reductions in imports and in investment. More- 
over, for the IMF’s category  of  “15  highly  indebted  countries,” the 
Table 12.1  Selected Indicators for Major Debtors, 1979-88’ 
Trade  Current  Ratio of  Average % 
Balance  Account  Rate of Change  Gross Capital  Central Government  Change 
(U.S. $  (U.S. $  of Per Capita  Formation to  Deficit as  Consumer 
Year  billions)  billions)  Real GDP  GDP  Percentage of  GDP  Price Index 
1979  -  1.9  -24.6  3.6  24.9  0.8  40.8 
1980  4.4  29.5  2.6  24.7  0.8  47.4 
1981  -7.5  -50.3  -1.6  24.5  3.7  53.2 
1982  3.2  -50.6  -  2.7  22.3  5.4  57.7 
1983  28.3  -15.2  -5.5  18.2  5.2  90.8 
1984  43.2  -0.6  -0.1  17.4  3.1  116.4 
1985  40.8  -0.1  0.9  16.5  2.7  126.9 
1986  22.9  -11.0  1.4  16.8  4.5  76.2 
1987  18.8  -  14.0  1.2  17.6  3.6  86.3 
1988  22.3  -10.5  2.4  n.a.  n.a.  87.2 
“These data refer to the IMF’s highly  indebted countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ivory Coast, Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Ven- 
ezuela, Yugoslavia. These data have been obtained from IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1987. 
n.a.  = not available. 252  Sebastian Edwards 
dollar value of exports was lower in 1986 than in 1980, with the mag- 
nitude of  this decline exceeding 15 percent. This drop was basically 
the result of a decline in the prices of these countries’ exports of almost 
25  percent between  1980 and 1986. 
For the major debtors as a group, investment declined from an av- 
erage of 26 percent of GDP in  1973-77  to an average of  17.2 percent 
in  1983-86.  In  most  cases public investment and investment in  the 
construction sector were the components most severely curtailed. Nat- 
urally, this decline  in  investment has  serious consequences  for the 
prospects of renewed growth. 
Most countries faced the need to reverse the direction of  the net 
transfers by  resorting to a combination of  expenditure-reducing and 
expenditure-switching  policies, including devaluation, the imposition 
of  capital controls, and import quotas. The adjustment required both 
a significant increase in real interest rates as well as major relative price 
changes or real devaluations.  In  most  cases the selection  of  policy 
packages was based on the perceived “effectiveness” of these policies 
in  the  short  run,  rather  than  on efficiency, income  distribution, or 
welfare considerations. As a result of  the efforts made to implement 
rapidly effective policies a number of trade-offs between different ob- 
jectives, including improvement in the current account and inflation, 
emerged during the process (Edwards 1987a). 
In spite of the relatively successful efforts to reduce public expen- 
ditures, fiscal deficits increased in relation to the precrisis period in the 
major debtors as a group. In many of these countries total tax revenues 
were negatively affected by the recessions that followed the crisis. As 
a consequence of  this decline, the reliance on inflationary financing 
increased substantially (see table 12.1). 
The restraint of wage increases was, in most countries, another major 
component of the expenditure-reducing package. In most countries the 
adjustment also relied on higher real interest rates, which helped keep 
expenditure, and in particular investment, in check. 
After August 1982 most countries also relied on expenditure-switch- 
ing policies; these consisted in most cases of a combination of nominal 
devaluations and, at least initially, of a major escalation in the degree 
of trade restrictions. The extent of the devaluations varied from country 
to country, being particularly severe in Latin America. In an effort to 
assure that the effects of the nominal devaluations on the real exchange 
rate did not erode via inflation, most countries adopted some kind of 
active exchange rate management where the exchange rate continued 
to be adjusted after the initial parity change. In fact, as of July  1986, 
out of the  15 major debtors 12 had some sort of  crawling peg regime 
consisting of periodical adjustments of the nominal rate somewhat re- 
lated to the differential between internal and external inflation (Edwards 
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Another important feature of the exchange rate policy followed by 
many countries was the adoption of multiple exchange rates. Imme- 
diately following the crisis in many (but not all) of the major debtors 
the devaluation policies were supplemented by the imposition of trade 
restrictions.  In some countries the extent of trade restrictions has re- 
cently been  somewhat relaxed, while  others have  announced some 
easing up in the near future. 
In spite of the significant efforts to adjust made by most of these 
countries, and of the costs incurred in the process, the magnitude of 
their trade surpluses has systematically  fallen  short of their interest 
payments.  In  Latin America, for example, in  1986 the interest bill 
amounted to 5.3 percent of GDP while the trade surplus reached 2.3 
percent of GDP. In most countries up to this point this financing gap 
has been  closed, usually  after long and protracted negotiations,  by 
packages of funds provided by the banks and the multilateral institutions. 
In sum, in spite of the involvement of the IMF in this first phase of 
the adjustment process, the actual policy  packages implemented  by 
most of the debt-troubled  countries differed markedly from what we 
can describe as  an orthodox IMF-type stabilization program. Generally 
speaking,  the current adjustment process has been inflationary  with 
high and persistent fiscal deficits, and with increasingly distorted ex- 
ternal sectors, with a profusion of quantitative restrictions (QRs) and 
multiple exchange rates. 
12.3  Trade Liberalization and Adjustment with Growth 
The emergency packages implemented until now have succeeded in 
averting what some considered to be an almost sure collapse of the 
world financial system. This has been achieved, however, at a signif- 
icant cost for the major debtors in terms of decline in employment, 
income, and standard of living. The key question now is how to move 
from the current situation towards what we can call phase 2  of the 
adjustment process, a phase characterized by adjustment and growth. 
A number of authors-and  indeed the supporters of the Baker plan, 
as well as the IMF-believe  that a rapid trade liberalization, coupled 
with devaluation, privatization, and financial reform, is the most rea- 
sonable strategy for achieving these objectives.  For example, Balassa 
et al. (1986, 88) have recommended that, among other things, the de- 
veloping nations should eliminate all QRs and reduce, during a period 
of five years, imports tariffs to a uniform 15 to 20 percent; these tariff 
reforms should be coupled with significant devaluations, in order not 
to “deprotect” the tradable goods sectors. In this section we analyze 
the potential role of trade liberalization in the next phase of the ad- 
justment process in the developing countries. We  emphasize the rela- 
tion between trade liberalization and export promotion, the employment 254  Sebastian Edwards 
effects of liberalization, and the relation between liberalization and anti- 
inflationary policies. 
12.3.1  Outward Orientation, Export Promotion, and Trade 
Liberalization 
There is little doubt that a longer-run solution of the debt crisis will 
require the adoption of policies that rely more heavily than in the past 
on export growth.2 Even ECLAKEPAL, the former champion of im- 
port  substitution  development, has recommended outward-oriented 
policies for the troubled Latin American nations (Bianchi et al. 1987). 
Outward orientation and export promotion require some kind of trade 
liberalization and tariff reduction, especially of imported inputs and 
capital goods. Indeed, the historical evidence clearly shows that those 
countries that have successfully pursued export promotion  (i.e. ,  the 
East Asian nations), have had a trade regime substantially more liberal 
than those countries that have followed indiscriminatory import sub- 
stitution based on protectionism  (Edwards 1987a). Although outward 
orientation requires  some  trade liberalization, there are no reasons, 
either theoretical or empirical, that suggest that the “optimal”  degree 
of liberalization implies zero, or even very low, tariffs coupled with no 
government intervention  in any sphere of the development process. 
Indeed the rich historical  lessons emanating from the Southern Cone 
suggest that this kind of extremely liberal reform may backfire at an 
immensely high cost in terms of output and employment (Edwards and 
Cox-Edwards 1987). The successful experiences with export-led growth 
in the East Asian countries also support this view; although in these 
countries trade regimes  have  been  significantly  liberal, government 
intervention in promoting exports has been important and tariffs have 
never been anything  close to a very low uniform level (Edwards 1987a).3 
Although it is not possible to make broad generalizations,  the evi- 
dence suggests that at the present time in the majority of the highly 
indebted countries the trade regime is still not sufficiently liberalized. 
In order to take advantage of more rapid growth based on the external 
sector, most of these countries will need to go through some type of 
rationalization  and  liberalization  of  their  imports  sector (Edwards 
1987a). 
12.3.2  Trade Liberalization with a Government Budget Constraint 
An important policy question is whether the trade liberalization com- 
ponent of an outward-oriented strategy should be attempted at the same 
time as a country is embarked on a severe stabilization and anti-infla- 
tionary program. Not surprisingly, the answer depends on the intensity 
of  the trade reform and of the ongoing inflation. 
Historically, there has been a close link between mild trade liberal- 
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successful liberalization accompanied by anti-inflationary policies have 
seldom consisted of the complete elimination of QRs and major tariff 
reductions of  the kind now recommended for the indebted countries. 
The Chilean episode with liberalization and stabilization between 1975 
and 1983 illustrates very vividly one of the most serious trade-offs that 
emerges when a substantial liberalization reform is undertaken at the 
same time  as a  major anti-inflation  program.  As in  most successful 
stabilization programs, in  the last  phase  of the Chilean stabilization 
effort, when inflation  was reduced from 40 percent to 9 percent per 
annum, there was a  significant real  exchange rate appreciation  that 
reduced the degree of competitiveness of the tradables sector at a time 
when, because of the trade reform among other factors, the equilibrium 
real exchange rates had significantly depreciated. In the Chilean case 
this real appreciation was partially the result of the active use of ex- 
change rate management to bring down inflation; in mid-1979 the nom- 
inal exchange rate was fixed relative to the dollar. As is well known 
by now this real appreciation  played an important role in the disap- 
pointing outcome of the Chilean episode; it seriously deprotected the 
tradables sector, it generated perverse expectations of devaluation and, 
ultimately, it conspired with the high real interest rates to provoke the 
worst financial debacle of Chilean history (Corbo  de Melo, and Tybout 
1986; Edwards and Cox-Edwards, 1987). 
A  crucial  objective  of  any stabilization  program-and,  indeed  of 
those undertaken by the major debtors-is  to reduce the magnitude of 
the fiscal deficit. Many times there will be an important trade-off be- 
tween a trade liberalization that reduces import tariffs and the achieve- 
ment of this fiscal objective.  Surprisingly, the policy  and theoretical 
literatures  on trade liberalization policies  have most times tended to 
ignore the fiscal role of tariffs in the developing nations. However, in 
many of the poorer countries governments use tariff proceeds exten- 
sively to finance their expenditure. Table  12.2, for example, contains 
data on the fiscal importance of taxes on international trade for eight 
countries. As may be seen, in some cases taxes on trade are as high 
as one-third of total revenue of the central government. 
As long as  tariff rates are below the maximum revenue Level there will 
be a trade-off between trade liberalization and the generation of the gov- 
ernment surplus required to finance debt servicing. Then, short of re- 
ducing government expenditures, what is required is to replace trade 
restrictions  by less distortive taxes that can generate the same (or a 
higher) amount of revenue. This, of course, means that major reforms 
of the tax system (i.e., the adoption of VATS) would be required in most 
countries. Tax reforms are not only politically difficult to have approved, 
but from an administrative perspective it is many times very difficult to 
get them going (see Conrad and Gillis 1984). This, of course, imposes 
some fiscal restrictions on the speed at which tariffs can be reduced. 256  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 12.2  Taxes on International Trade as a Percentage of Government 
Revenue: Selected Developing Countries, 1984 
Import Tariffs  )a  (  Taxes on Trade 
Total Tax Revenue  Total Revenue 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Mexico 
Peru 
Philippines 
4.9% 
25.6 
13.4 
3.5 
16.  I 
3.0 
10.2 
22.1 
13.3% 
30.0 
10.8 
3.3 
14.0 
2.7 
n.a. 
23.7 
Source: Constructed from raw data from the International Monetary Fund’s Government 
Finances Statistics  Yearbook. 
aRefers to central government. 
n.a. = not available. 
Although in most cases the implementation of a major tax reform 
will  take a substantial  amount of time, there are some policies con- 
ducive both towards improved efficiency and higher revenues in the 
short run. The most obvious one is the replacement  of  QRs, (i.e., 
licenses, prohibitions, and so on ) by import tariffs (Edwards 1987a). 
In terms of the sequencing of reform, then, an important principle 
is to make sure that tariff reduction reforms should only be undertaken 
once the fiscal deficit is under control. In many cases this will mean 
that the tax system has to be reformed and other sources of revenue 
have been found. Replacing QRs by tariffs, or  devising a QR auctioning 
system are measures that can be implemented without producing fiscal 
costs, while at the same time they improve efficiency. Also, by solving 
the fiscal imbalance first, the probability of a dangerous real exchange 
rate overvaluation is reduced. 
12.3.3  Tariff Reform and Unemployment 
The effects of trade reform on employment are a key consideration 
when evaluating the short-run effects of these policies. This is partic- 
ularly the case under the current conditions, when the highly indebted 
countries are already experiencing very high levels of unemployment. 
Moreover, from  a  political  economy perspective the unemployment 
effects of  any policy are crucial; democratic governments-and  even 
those not so democratic, but in a weakened position-will  try not to 
generate massive  unemployment:  The costs of employment  are rec- 
ognized  in the short run, while the benefits of the structural policies 
that provoked it usually are reaped in the medium run, when a different 
government is in office. 257  Structural Adjustment Policies in Highly Indebted Countries 
Models of adjustment in  an open economy discussed in  Edwards 
(1988) suggest that, contrary to the most simplistic textbook view, as 
long as it takes time to reallocate capital from one sector to the other 
and  (real) wages exhibit  some inflexibility,  a tariff reduction reform 
may very well result in large unemployment in the short run. A first- 
best solution to this problem is to (fully) eliminate the source of real 
wage rigidity; with complete flexibility wages will, in the short run, go 
down until all the labor force is absorbed. In the longer run, however, 
as capital  is reallocated, real  wages  will  increase and surpass their 
prereform level. If for political or other reasons real wages cannot fall 
sufficiently in the short run, a second-best solution is to  proceed slowly 
with the trade reform; tariffs should be reduced gradually in a prean- 
nounced fashion. In theory, in this way capital owners will have time 
to reallocate capital, avoiding the short-run unemployment effects of 
the trade reform (see Edwards 1988). A crucial point, however, for this 
solution to work is that capital allocation in fact responds to the an- 
nouncement of reform; that is, the reform should be credible. 
The limited existing evidence on the short-run aggregate employment 
consequences of trade liberalization indicates that in the case of mild 
reforms there have not  been  significant aggregate unemployment  ef- 
fects. This, indeed, would seem to be one of the preliminary conclu- 
sions of the exhaustive cross-country study undertaken at the World 
Bank and directed by Papageorgiou, Michaely, and Choksi (1986). In 
terms of  substantial  trade reforms  the Chilean  experience, with  its 
textbook-type policies, is educational. Between  1974 and 1979 Chile 
underwent one of the most, if  not the most, ambitious trade liberali- 
zation of the modern time: Quantitative restrictions  were fully elimi- 
nated, a multiple exchange rate system consisting of up to 15 different 
exchange rates was unified, and tariffs were slashed to a uniform  10 
percent. Edwards (1985), for example, calculated than an upper bound 
for the unemployment effects of the trade reform was 3.5 percentage 
points  of  the labor  force, or 129,000 people, with  the bulk  of  this 
unemployment  located in the food, beverages, tobacco, textiles  and 
leather products subsectors (57,000 people). More recently, de la Cuadra 
and Hachette (1986) have calculated that the trade reform generated a 
reduction of employment in the manufacturing sector of approximately 
50,000 workers. Even though these are not negligible numbers, they 
clearly indicate that an explanation for the bulk of the Chilean unem- 
ployment should be sought elsewhere (Edwards and Cox-Edwards 1987). 
In sum, a gradual lowering of tariffs offers a number of attractive 
features for economies such as the debt-ridden  countries. First, this 
strategy is likely to reduce the short-run unemployment consequences 
of the trade reform. Second, there will likely be positive effects on 
savings helping growth  prospect^.^ Third, it will  tend to improve the 258  Sebastian Edwards 
current account. And  finally, a gradual reduction of tariffs will  have 
positive  effects  on the government budget.  On the negative  side a 
gradual trade reform may lack credibility, in which case it may even 
induce perverse responses (see section 12.3.5). 
12.3.4  Structural Adjustment and Devaluation 
Nominal devaluations are an important component of most stabili- 
zation programs, and they have played a central role in the adjustment 
efforts following the debt crisis. The purpose of these nominal deval- 
uations  is  to generate a real  exchange rate adjustment, that would 
reverse the real appreciation that usually precedes the balance of pay- 
ments crisis. 
Until quite recently most traditional structural adjustment programs 
in the developing nations have contemplated discrete nominal  deval- 
uations, where the official nominal exchange rate is abruptly adjusted 
by a fairly large percentage.  More recently, however, more and more 
countries are opting for the adoption of some sort of crawling peg after 
the devaluation. In a recent study on 18 devaluation episodes in Latin 
America, Edwards (1987b) found that those countries that had adopted 
a crawling peg had been significantly more successful in sustaining a 
real depreciation than the discrete devaluers. This study indicates that 
among the Latin American crawlers in Bolivia (1982), Peru (1975), and 
Mexico (1982) the higher real exchange rate was sustained at the cost 
of substantial permanent increase in rate of inflation. 
In spite of the prominent  role of devaluations  in conventional  ad- 
justment programs, very little  work has investigated  empirically  the 
effects of devaluations on the real  level of economic activity  or on 
income distribution.  A study by Edwards (1986) suggests that in the 
short run devaluation has led to a slight fall in output in the developing 
countries. A 10 percent depreciation leads to a one-time loss of almost 
1 percent of GNP. In the second year, the economy returns to trend. 
To  the extent that more rapid  trade liberalizations require larger de- 
valuations,  these results  provide  new  arguments in favor of gradual 
reforms. 
12.3.5  Credibility, Sustainability, and Reversibility of Trade 
Reforms 
Credibility  is a fundamental  ingredient of  successful structural re- 
forms. If the public attaches a nontrivial probability to policy reversal, 
it will try to anticipate this event, generally introducing strong desta- 
bilizing forces into the structural adjustment process. Latin America’s 
history  is  replete  with  frustrated economic reforms  that  have failed 
because of the lack of credibility. (See Rodriguez 1983 for an analysis 
of the Argentine experience under Martinez de Hoz.) 259  Structural Adjustment  Policies in Highly Indebted Countries 
The inability to establish consistency between fiscal and exchange 
rate policies  has many  times  been at the heart of  the trade reform 
credibility crisis in Latin America. For example, in most cases where 
(mild) trade reforms have been reversed, the public early on perceived 
that the inflation tax required to finance the fiscal deficit was inconsis- 
tent with maintaining a predetermined  nominal exchange rate. Under 
these  circumstances expectations of  overvaluation, speculative at- 
tacks, exchange controls, and future devaluations developed. In trying 
to anticipate these events the optimizing private sector will usually take 
steps-such  as diversifying its portfolio internationally (i.e.,  “capital 
flight”)-that  will  sometimes move the economy in the opposite di- 
rection from that intended by the reform. Edwards (1987b) has found 
that more than 80 percent of reversals of trade liberalizations in Latin 
America can be traced to inconsistent fiscal policies. 
An important question is whether a gradual (i.e., slow) trade reform 
will be more or less credible than an abrupt one. Theoretical models 
of credibility of economic policy are only now being developed, and 
have not  yet reached a level that enables us to answer this question 
with enough precision. In principle, it is possible to argue that grad- 
ualism  has characteristics that work  in  both directions, at the same 
time  enhancing and compromising credibility.  On one hand-by  re- 
ducing the unemployment  effect  and  by  allowing for a  firmer fiscal 
equilibrium-a  gradual trade reform will tend to be more credible; on 
the other hand, a slow reform will allow those groups negatively  af- 
fected by it (i.e., the import substitution manufacturing sector) to or- 
ganize and lobby against the policies.  At the end, as is so often the 
case in  economics, whether gradualism will  enhance credibility will 
depend on factors specific to each country. What is clear, however, is 
that policymakers  should always  pay  special attention to the estab- 
lishment of credibility  when pursuing important long-term structural 
changes. 
Although  at this  point,  given our knowledge of the policymaking 
process and its interaction with the private sector, it is not possible to 
derive a precise theorem, the arguments presented in this section- 
including unemployment, fiscal, and other considerations-suggest  that, 
in general, it would be more prudent to implement the trade reform 
component of an outward-orientation  policy in a gradual way. 
12.4  Conclusion 
The adjustment  packages  of  1982-87  sought  “effectiveness.”  On 
some grounds, and especially in terms of the turnarounds of the current 
accounts, the results have been quite impressive. The costs, however, 
have been high. Not only did real income decline, but real wages de- 260  Sebastian Edwards 
clined  in  most countries, and unemployment  soared. There is  little 
doubt that  this  is  not  a sustainable  adjustment path.  A  successful 
adjustment means that debtor countries will have to bring down their 
debt-to-GDP ratios to a level consistent with the reestablishment  of 
creditworthiness, while  recovering  their  growth  of  output and  con- 
sumption. The first objective means that the country has to transfer a 
given discounted value of resources to the rest of the world. The second 
means that the country has to increase its rate of capital formation and 
the efficiency of resource use. The problem faced by the highly indebted 
nations can be posed as follows: how to minimize the present value of 
the consumption costs associated with making a transfer of  a specific 
discounted value? The problem then has two dimensions: how to min- 
imize the cost of the transfer at each moment of time, including its 
distributive aspect, and what should be the flow of transfers over time 
consistent with a given present value of the flow‘? 
A sustained increase in the indebted countries exports, which is, of 
course, a prerequisite for a long-term  solution to the crisis, will  not 
only require an efficient tradables sector  and a “realistic”  real exchange 
rate but, more important, that the current protectionist  trend  in the 
industrial countries and in particular in the United States be reversed. 
Data presented in Edwards (1987~)  indicate that at this time the extent 
of nontariff barriers as a form of protection in the industrial countries 
is very significant. Moreover, the data show that these trade impedi- 
ments are particularly important for goods originating in the developing 
nations, and that their tariff  equivalents are in many cases very  sig- 
nificant. Asking the highly indebted developing countries to pay their 
debts and at the same time impeding their exports from reaching the 
industrialized markets is not only unfair, but also politically unwise. 
Notes 
1. The cause behind the spectacular growth in borrowing during the 1974- 
82 period varied from country to country. See Edwards (1987a) for a detailed 
discussion. 
2. There is now a vast literature that clearly suggests that outward-oriented 
countries have greatly outperformed those nations that have followed discrim- 
inatory import substitution policies.  See, for example, the World  Bank 1987 
World Development Report and the literature cited therein. On CEPAL see, 
for example, Bianchi, Devlin, and Ramos (1987). 
3. The case of Korea, for example, is highly educational. In 1985, 90 percent 
of Korean imports were subject to automatic approval (i.e., were not subject 
to any form of licensing) and the average tariff was only 26 percent. 
4.  See, for example, Krueger (1978) and Little (1982). 
5. This will take place by means of the change in the consumption rate of 
interest (Edwards 1987a). 261  Structural Adjustment Policies in Highly  Indebted Countries 
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